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Greenhouse gases and climate change — relevance to discharge permit
application
Editorial by Ceri Warnock
The decision of Greenpeace New Zealand v Northland
Regional Council considered to what extent, if at all, con-
sent authorities are permitted to take into account climate
change factors when considering applications for discharge
of greenhouse gases.1
In 2005, Northland Regional Council and Whangarei
District Council granted consent to Mighty River Power
Limited (Mighty River) authorising the operation ofMarsden
B, a coal-fired electricity-generating station. Greenpeace
New Zealand lodged an appeal against this decision. The
notice of appeal averred error on the part of the consent
authorities in, inter alia, finding that “s 104E specifically
prohibits them from considering the effects of climate
change and in not considering the benefits to be derived
from the use and development of renewable energy”.2
Fundamentally, Greenpeace argued that the decision failed
to pay regard to s 7(i) and (j) of the Resource Management
Act 1991 (RMA):
7 Other Matters
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercis-
ing functions and powers under it, in relation to manag-
ing the use, development, and protection of natural and
physical resources, shall have particular regard to —
…
(i) the effects of climate change:
(j) the benefits to be derived from the use and devel-
opment of renewable energy.
Mighty River applied to strike out the grounds of the appeal
relating to the effects of climate change on the basis that
they “disclosed no reasonable or relevant argument” (in
accordance with s 279(4)(b) of the RMA) and were “clearly
untenable”.3 The Environment Court Judge struck out the
offending parts of the notice. Greenpeace appealed to the
High Court.
Submissions
Counsel for Mighty River advocated an interpretation of
s 104E of the RMA that restricted consent authorities’
consideration of the climate change effects of greenhouse
gas discharge to applications specifically concerning renew-
able energy projects. As Mighty River’s proposal did not
concern a renewable energy project, counsel submitted
that the consent authority was not entitled to consider the
effects of the discharge of greenhouse gases fromMarsden
B and s 7(j) was rendered irrelevant (at paras [31] and [37]).
Further, counsel averred that “the 2004 Amendment made
plain that the effects of the discharge of greenhouse gases
on climate change are to be dealt with under the Act only at
a national level” (at para [35]).
Counsel for Greenpeace submitted that “the 104E excep-
tion applies to applications whether for renewable or non-
renewable energy proposals” (at para [18]) and that “s 7(j)
required all benefits of renewable energy to be considered
in all resource consent applications not just those limited to
reducing climate change” (at para [17]). In the original
notice of appeal, Greenpeace posited an economic argu-
ment submitting that, as the costs of greenhouse gas emis-
sions are not internalised by coal-fired energy production,
the coal industry is effectively subsidised. This subsidy
makes renewable energy production, by comparison, less
competitive and hinders the development of such (see
Environment Court judgment at para [12]). Counsel for
Greenpeace returned to the issue of macroeconomic con-
siderations in the High Court, averring that Greenpeace
shouldbepermittedtoadduceevidenceon“relevantmacroeconomic
effect” at a substantive hearing, and that this was a valid
factor for the consent authority to have regard to (at
para [28]).
Decision
The High Court noted (at para [41]) that the preliminary part
of s 104E sets out three criteria for consent applications
that must be met before the section comes into play. First,
the application must be for a discharge or a coastal permit.
Secondly, the proposed activity must contravene ss 15 or
15B (note that s 15(1)(c) of the Act is relevant in the present
case not s 15(2) as Williams J seems to suggest in para [41]).
Finally, the activity must contravene ss 15 or 15B by pro-
posing a discharge of greenhouse gases into air. If an
application qualifies on all three limbs, the Court noted (at
para [42]) that:
the section requires the consent authority to have no
regard to the effect of the discharge of those green-
house gases on “climate change” as defined in s 2.
TheCourt, however, then acknowledged the conflict between
the first part of s 104E and s 7(i) and concluded that:
such conflict is to be resolved by the exception to 104E
[contained in the final part of the section] which permits
the consent authority to consider an application which
otherwise qualifies under the earlier terms of the section
to the extent that the application proposes the use and
development of renewable energy and thuswould enable
reduction of the discharge into air of greenhouse gases
either in absolute terms or terms relevant to the use and
development of non-renewable energy (at para [44]).
Accordingly, the Court (at para [49]) mandated that con-
sent authorities should:
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take into account that a “reduction in the discharge into
air of greenhouse gases” arising from the “use and
development of renewable energy” is an activity which
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is beneficial in terms of s 7(j). It must therefore be the
case that one of the factors which the consent authority
is entitled to take into account in considering whether to
grant discharge (or coastal) permits for activities which
relate to the “discharge into air of greenhouse gases” is
whether the applicationwill result in thebeneficial “reduc-
tion in the discharge into air of greenhouse gases”
because the application includes the “use and develop-
ment of renewable energy”.
Further, the Court stated (at para [50]) that:
[i]f the application for a discharge permit which other-
wise qualifies under s 104E includes no proposal which,
if consented to and built, would enable a “reduction in
the discharge into air of greenhouse gases” by the “use
and development of renewable energy” then that, too, is
a factor the consent authority is entitled to take into
account in deciding whether to exercise its discretion
and grant resource consent. Thus the consent authori-
ty’s discretion to grant resource consent for discharge
permits which otherwise qualify under s 104E which
include a proposal which, when built, would result in a
“reduction in the discharge into air of greenhouse gases”
by the “use and development of renewable energy” are
more likely to be granted than discharge permit applica-
tions which otherwise qualify under s 104E but include
no proposal incorporating those features. To that extent
– and to that extent alone – the consent authority may
“have regard to the effects of such a discharge on
climate change”.
The Court determined that such an interpretation “accords
with the final provisions of s 104E” (at para [51]), accords
with s 70A (at para [53]), and also s 7 (at para [54]). In
practice, the Court noted that the final part of s 104E
bestows upon consent authorities:
power to balance a proposal involving the “use and
development of renewable energy” which “enables a
reduction in the discharge into air of greenhouse gases”
against the proposal itself which must involve the “use
anddevelopment of non-renewable energy” (at para [51]).
The Court (at para [57]) confirmed that the comparative
exercise would not concern “the entire discharge from the
proposing user of non-renewable energy” but would only
involve consideration of the discharge of greenhouse gases.
The view that “the thrust of the 2004 Amendment was to
put regulation of the discharge into air of greenhouse gases
in the national arena” was accordingly “only partially cor-
rect” (at para [57]). The Court found that the Environment
Court fell into error in determining that the effects of
discharge on climate change could only be considered in
applications for projects concerning renewable energy.
Williams J overturned the decision of Environment Court
and directed the parties to redraft the grounds of appeal in
accordance with the judgment given.
Comment
The High Court has provided a thought-provoking, albeit
difficult, judgment on the interrelationship between sec-
tions in the RMA relevant to climate change issues. In
particular, the Court has provided an answer to the seem-
ingly intractable contradiction contained within s 3 of the
ResourceManagement (Energy andClimateChange)Amend-
ment Act 2004 and between ss 7 and 104E of the RMA.
The Court accepted that s 104E has a confining function,
however, this does not equate to debarring a consent
authority from any consideration of the effects of green-
house gas emissions on climate change. The section does,
however, limit the consent authorities’ consideration of the
link between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
Thus, a consent authority is not entitled to consider the
relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and cli-
mate change in a wholesale manner via a wide-ranging
review of the issue but rather to take as a given the fact that
a reduction in emissions brought about by the use of
renewable energy is of benefit. Thereafter, consent authori-
ties are limited in their decision making, to taking into
account “whether the application will result in the benefi-
cial ‘reduction in the discharge into air of greenhouse
gases’ because the application includes the ‘use and devel-
opment of renewable energy’” (at para [49]). This consid-
eration is to be included in decision making relating to both
applications concerning renewable energy projects and, by
virtue of the comparative exercise set out in s 104E(b), in
those concerning non-renewable projects.
The decision is of particular interest with regards to two
issues. First, the High Court’s approach to s 104E(b) is of
importance and likely to cause controversy. Rejecting an
interpretation of s 104E(a) and (b) as delineating applica-
tions for various renewable energy projects (for example
s 104E(a) may be applicable to wind farms and subs (b)
applicable to bio-fuel plants), the Court read s 104E(b) as
bringing into play applications for non-renewable energy
projects. In essence, the Court concluded that s 104E con-
tains a comparative exercise that permits consent authori-
ties to balance the benefits, in terms of greenhouse gas
reduction, of a hypothetical renewable energy project against
the actual application concerning a non-renewable energy
project (at para [51]).
A number of questions flow from this conclusion. In
using a hypothetical renewable energy project as a coun-
terpoint to a non-renewable energy proposal, the question
is: What exactly does the consent authority have to weigh in
the balance? Is it simply a matter of taking note that a
non-renewable energy proposal will emit greenhouse gases
and this is a negative factor to be incorporated into the
equation, or will the authority have to go into detail in
comparing the actual quantity of greenhouse gases emit-
ted? If the latter approach is correct, it must be asked:
Which type of renewable energy project does one use as a
comparison? There are many forms of renewable energy
production and, depending on the technology chosen, there
will be varying quantities of greenhouse gases emitted from
renewable energy projects. Theoretically, such an exercise
may be facilitated by reference to local authority planning
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documents. What do relevant planning documents provide
for? The Court confirmed that s 70A permitted local author-
ity promulgation of rules concerning the use and develop-
ment of renewable energy and that the focus of this section
is to prevent local rules from being more stringent than
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national rules when introduced (at para [53]). In practice,
however, this conduit may prove to be of limited assistance
in formulating the appropriate equation. It is difficult to
envisage local authorities planning for specific renewable
energy projects, other than to highlight that applications
are to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
The second area of likely debate concerns Greenpeace’s
argument that all the benefits flowing from the use and
development of renewable energy, not just climate change
benefits, should be taken into account in any application for
a permit. In the absence of an order, it is difficult to
categorically state that the Court rejected this argument,
but this does appear to be the case when one considers
para [50] (see above) and the judicial comments in para [61],
where Williams J stated that “[this judgment] may not go as
far as Greepeace wished in defining the issues which can be
taken into account in permit applications qualifying under
s 104E”.
Thus, if consent authorities are prevented from consid-
ering other benefits of renewable energy in applications for
non-renewable energy proposals, they will be unable to
take into account the economic factors that Greenpeace
argued for. If this is correct, it will not be possible for
consent authorities to consider, for example, that a pro-
posal may ultimately increase the number of “carbon cred-
its” the government must acquire to ensure compliance
with New Zealand’s international obligations. By way of
note, it is of course possible by virtue of the s 88(2)
“assessment of environmental effects” for all the benefits
of renewable energy use and development to be taken into
account in an application specifically concerning a renew-
able energy project.
The aforesaid queries aside, however, fundamentally,
theHighCourt has rejected the contention that local authori-
ties have no role to play in the mitigation of discharges of
greenhouses gases other than via consent applications for
renewable energy. Mighty River has consistently argued
that measures to achieve climate change mitigation are
within the sole preserve of central government. At Environ-
ment Court level, Mighty River prayed in aid extracts from
Hansard, 26 February 2004, concerning the third reading of
the Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change)
Amendment Bill.
The Associate Minister of Energy stated that:
the Government has chosen to control the impact of
climate change fromgreenhousegas emissions atNational
level. By removing the ability for regional councils to
apply controls, this Bill removes the potential ability for
duplication and unnecessary cost to occur and the poten-
tial for local controls to conflict withNational objectives.4
Mighty River therefore argued that as the government has
not promulgated the national environmental standards sug-
gested by s 104F, this removes consent authorities’ ability
to consider the contribution to climate change of green-
house gases emitted by non-renewable energy projects.
The argument is an interesting one but may prove ulti-
mately to be a double-edged sword for Mighty River if the
High Court reasoning is upheld. To equate the imperative of
the issue being dealt with at a national level with the
necessity for the promulgation of central government plan-
ning instruments is to miss a subtle point. The aim is to
ensure that the matter is dealt with on a uniform basis,
nationwide. Statutory imperatives can provide nationwide
uniformity. The High Court’s interpretation of s 104E, and
its interrelationship with s 7, meets this objective. Thus, the
very fact that all consent authorities have a statutory duty
to take note of first, the inherent undesirability of industrial
discharges (s 15(1) as opposed to s 15(2)), secondly, the de
facto and de jure undesirability of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and thirdly, the utilisation of the s 104E comparative
tool in consent applications, has been brought about by a
national instrument providing for uniformity, the Resource
Management Act.
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